

## บทคัดย่อ

บทความนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่ออธิบายจุดเริ่มต้นของการแสวงหาความจริงในคัมภีร์อุปนิษัทและพระสูตรตันตปิฎก

ชาวอินเดียในสมัยโบราณโดยทั่วไปสนใจอย่างมากในการปฏิบัติทางศาสนาและการอบรมจิต ไม่ใช้การคิดตามหลักตรรกะ แม้กระนั้น ก็ไม่ได้หมายความว่าพวกเขาไม่สนใจในการค้นหาความจริงทางปรัชญา ความจริง (สันสกฤต สตย, บาลี สจฺจ) นี่คือนิยามที่ไม่มีใครตาย สิ่งนี้คือ พุรุษ บางครั้งก็เรียกว่า ความจริงของความจริง (สตยสย สตย) ในคัมภีร์อุปนิษัท และสิ่งนี้คือ ฌมม ในพระสูตรตันตปิฎกด้วย และในสมัยอินเดียโบราณ การค้นหาความจริงนิยมใช้เครื่องมือ คือ ความรู้ (สันสกฤต จฺเญาน, บาลี ปญฺญา)

ในคัมภีร์อุปนิษัทที่เก่าแก่และพระพุทธศาสนาในยุคแรกเริ่มทั้งสองระบุว่า ความรู้หรือความรู้แจ้ง เป็นจุดเริ่มต้นของการค้นหาความจริง ยิ่งกว่านั้น ความรู้แจ้งนี้หมายถึง “transcendental knowledge” หรือ “universal knowledge” กล่าวคือ ความรู้แจ้งนี้เป็นสิ่งที่ทำให้เข้าใจโลกที่ไม่ยั่งยืนทั้งหมด หรือทำให้โลกที่ไม่ยั่งยืนทั้งหมดปรากฏออกมา ในบทความนี้พบว่าเรื่องความรู้ ซึ่งเป็นจุดเริ่มต้นของการแสวงหาความจริงนั้น พระพุทธศาสนาในยุคแรกเริ่มถือตามหลักการของคัมภีร์อุปนิษัทที่เก่าแก่อย่างแท้จริง

## ABSTRACT

THIS PAPER'S PURPOSE IS TO CLARIFY THE STARTING POINT OF THE PURSUIT OF THE TRUTH IN THE UPANIṢADS AND THE SUTTA-PIṬAKA.

GENERALLY IN ANCIENT INDIA, THE PEOPLE'S MAIN CONCERN LIES IN A RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND A SPIRITUAL CULTIVATION, NOT IN A THEORETICAL SPECULATION. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THEY HAVE NO INTEREST IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST FOR THE TRUTH. THIS "TRUTH" (SKT. SATYA, PĀLI SACCA) IS THE IMMORTAL. IT IS BRAHMA, WHICH IS ALSO CALLED "THE TRUTH OF TRUTH" (SATYASYA SATYAṀ), IN THE UPANIṢADS. OR IT IS THE DHAMMA IN THE SUTTA-PIṬAKA. TO UNDERSTAND THIS PURSUIT OF THE TRUTH IN ANCIENT INDIA, THERE IS A CLUE. IT IS "KNOWLEDGE" (SKT. JÑĀNA, PĀLI PAÑÑĀ).

IN BOTH THE OLD UPANIṢADS AND EARLY BUDDHISM, THIS KNOWLEDGE, OR THIS INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE, IS THE STARTING POINT OF THE PURSUIT OF THE TRUTH. MOREOVER, IN BOTH OF THEM, THIS INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE IS REGARDED AS "TRANSCENDENTAL KNOWLEDGE" OR "UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE." IN OTHER WORDS, THIS KNOWLEDGE IS THAT THROUGH WHICH THIS WHOLE EPHEMERAL WORLD IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD, OR THAT THROUGH WHICH THE WHOLE EXISTENCE OF THIS EPHEMERAL WORLD IS ESTABLISHED. THIS PAPER CONCLUDES THAT, IN REGARD TO THIS KNOWLEDGE AS THE STARTING POINT OF THE PURSUIT OF THE TRUTH, EARLY BUDDHISM IS AN AUTHENTIC FOLLOWER OF THE OLD UPANIṢADS.

# Concept of Truth in the Upaniṣads and the Sutta-piṭaka\*

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## Introduction

Generally in ancient India, the people's main concern lies in a religious practice and a spiritual cultivation, not in a theoretical speculation. However, it does not necessarily mean that they have no interest in the philosophical quest for the truth. This "truth" (Skt. *satya*, Pāli *sacca*) is the Immortal. It is Brahma, which is also called "the truth of truth" (*satyasya satyam*), in the Upaniṣads. Or it is the Dhamma in the Sutta-piṭaka. To understand this pursuit of the truth in ancient India, there is a clue.

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\*\*As for the texts of the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara's commentaries on them, this study is based on the following edition: Śaṅkarācārya, **Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit. vol. 1, Ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya** (*Śrīśaṅkarācāryagranthāvalī prathamā bhāga - Īśādidaśopaniṣadaḥ Śāṅkarabhāṣyasametāḥ*) (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978). In this paper, this title is abbreviated as **ĪDUŚB**. The verses of the Upaniṣads are indicated as in (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, 1.1.1) --- the three numbers in the reference stand for "chapter," "section," and "verse" ---, or as in (*Kena-upaniṣad*, 1.1) --- the two numbers in the reference stand for "section" and "verse" ---.

It is “knowledge” (Skt. *jñāna*, Pāli *paññā*) --- this is not empirical knowledge such as sense perceptions and so on, but a kind of intuition, although it is still different from a blind intuition, which might be fancied simply beyond our empirical knowledge ---. This paper’s purpose is to present this intuitive knowledge as the starting point of the pursuit of the truth and to clarify a philosophical meaning of this knowledge in the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism, referring to Śaṅkara’s commentaries on the Upaniṣads, Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka, and so on.<sup>1</sup>

## Simile of arrow

In the old Upaniṣads, the word “truth” has various meanings. However, in regard to the immortal truth, there is a specific way to indicate it. It is expounded thus: “Om! The knower of Brahma attains the highest. It is said thus: ‘Brahma is truth, knowledge, and infinity.’ He who knows [Brahma] as placed in the hiding place and in the supreme space, obtains all desirable things, along with Brahma, the wise” (*Taittirīya-upaniṣad*, 2.1.1). *om brahma-vid āpnoti param. tad eṣābhyuktā. satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma. yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyām parama vyoman. so’snute sarvān kāmān saha. brahmaṇā vipaściteti*.<sup>3</sup> In this text, “knowledge” (*jñāna*) --- which is also said to be the nature of the Self (*ātmanah svarūpaṃ*) --- can not be empirical, but intuitive. There is a simile which indicates the intuitiveness of this sort of knowledge. It is a simile of arrow (*śara*).

<sup>1</sup> As for the Sutta-piṭaka, this study uses the Royal Thai edition: มหาหมกุฏราชวิทยาลัย, สยามภุมมุตตส เตปิฏกั (กรุงเทพฯ: โรงพิมพ์มหาหมกุฏราชวิทยาลัย, พ.ศ. 2523). The text of Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka is based on Mahidol University’s CD edition: สำนักคอมพิวเตอรื มหาวิทยาลัยมหิดล, พระไตรปิฏกอรรถกถา-ฎีกาฉบับคอมพิวเตอรื BUDSIR/TT V.3 for Windows [CD-ROM] (พ.ศ. 2548). Citations from the Sutta-piṭaka are indicated as in (ที.สี. 9/1/1) --- the three numbers in the reference stand for “volume,” “item,” and “page” ---, and citations from the Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka are indicated as in (ที.อ. 1/1) --- the two numbers in the reference stand for “book” and “page” ---. Abbreviations ที.สี., ที.ม., ที.ปา., ม.ม., ม.อ., ที.อ., and ม.อ. stand for ทีฆนิกาย สลฎษนุชฎค, ทีฆนิกาย มหาวคค, ทีฆนิกาย ปาฎิฎคค, มชฎมินิกาย มุลปณณาสก, มชฎมินิกาย มชฎมิปณณาสก, มชฎมินิกาย อูปรปณณาสก, ทีฆนิกาย อฎฎกถา, and มชฎมินิกาย อฎฎกถา respectively.

<sup>2</sup> IDUŚ., 280.

In regard to the imperishable Brahma (*akṣaram brahma*), which is explained thus, “That is this truth, that is immortal, that is to be penetrated” (*tad etat satyaṃ tad amṛtaṃ tad veddhavyaṃ*),<sup>3</sup> this simile of arrow (*śara*) is expounded as follows: “Having taken the bow, the Upaniṣads’ great weapon, one should place [in it] the arrow sharpened through meditation. Having drawn [the bow], Oh good one, hit (*viddhi*) the target, the imperishable [Brahma], with the consciousness which has attained that state” (*Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad*, 2.2.3). *dhanur grhītva upaniṣadam mahāstraṃ śaraṃ hy upāsāniśitaṃ sandadhīta. āyamyā tadbhāvagatena cetasā lakṣyaṃ tad evākṣaraṃ somya viddhi*.<sup>4</sup>

Here is expressed the oneness of Brahma, the typical dogmatic theme of the old Upaniṣads, as “one should become [one with Brahman] just like an arrow” (*śaravattanmayo bhavet*).<sup>5</sup> But, what is to be noted here is “piercing,” “penetrating,” or “hitting” itself --- *veddhavya* (to be pierced) and *viddhi* (shoot; imperative, the second person, singular) are derived from a verbal root *vyadh* or *vidh* ----. This expression “piercing” or “penetrating” does not only imply “oneness,” but a peculiarity of intuitive knowledge in the old Upaniṣads. The commentator gives an explanation about the word *veddhavya* thus: “‘That is to be penetrated’ (*tad-veddhavyaṃ*) means that it is to be hit by the mind. It means that the mind should be concentrated on it.” *tad veddhavyaṃ manasā tāḍayitavyam. tasmin*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>5</sup> The verse (*Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad*, 2.2.4) runs thus: “The mystical syllable om is the bow. The Self is verily the arrow, and Brahma is called that target. It is to be penetrated without intoxication. One should become one with that [Brahma] just like the arrow.” *praṇavo dhanuḥ śaro hy ātmā brahma tal lakṣyaṃ ucyate. apramattena veddhavyaṃ śaravat tanmayo bhavet. Ibid.*

*manaḥsamādhānaṃ kartavyam ity arthaḥ.*<sup>6</sup> “The target, Brahma, is to be penetrated (*veddhavya*), without being intoxicated (*apramatta*), without any intoxication of thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) to obtain the external objects, without any passion at all, with the sense-organs controlled, and with the concentration of mind (*ekāgracitta*).” *apramattena bāhyaviṣayopalabdhitṛṣṇā-pramāḍavarjitenā sarvato viraktena jitendriyeṇaikāgracittena veddhavyaṃ brahma lakṣyam.*<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, in early Buddhism also, the intuitiveness of this type of knowledge,<sup>9</sup> which is usually indicated by the words *paññā* (Skt. *prajñā*) and *ñāṇa* (Skt. *jñāna*), is explained in a similar way. For example, *paṭivijjhati* (pierce, penetrate, Skt; *prati-vidhyati* --- its verbal root is *vidh* or *vyadh*) is used as closely related to *pajānāti* (know intuitively), as will be seen later on.

## Jñāna

The word *jñāna*, which is derived from a verbal root *jñā* (to know), literally means “knowledge.” However, in the old Upaniṣads this word *jñāna* --- or *vidyā* --- usually stands for “intuitive knowledge,” while the words *vijñāna*, *saṃjñā*, and *buddhi* usually mean empirical or individual knowledge --- this empirical knowledge is rather bodily function, and it belongs to internal organ, which is called *buddhi* (intellect), *manas* (mind), or *cit* (consciousness) ---. Besides, in the old Upaniṣads the usage of the word *vijñāna* is not always consistent. This word is sometimes used instead of *jñāna* as “intuitive knowledge,” while in many cases it stands for empirical knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> ĪDUŚB., 160.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 161.

<sup>8</sup> An example of “a simile of arrow” is found in the *Visuddhimagga*: “Non-delusion has the characteristic of penetrating [things] according to [their] essence, or it has the characteristic of infallible penetration, as the penetration of an arrow shot by a skilful archer.” *Amoho yathāsabhāvapaṭivedha- lakkaṇo, akkhalitapaṭivedhalakkaṇo vā kusalissāsakkhittausupaṭivedho viya, ...* Henry Clarke Warren and Dharmananda Kosambi, ed. *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1950), 393.

As for *jñāna* as “intuitive knowledge,” it is noteworthy that this knowledge is discussed in a close relation with the words “knower” (*jñātṛ*), “knower” (*vijñātṛ*), and “seer” (*draṣṭṛ*). For example, a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* speaks of “seer” thus: “‘Explain to me Brahma which is immediate and direct, and which is the Self within all.’ ‘This is your Self that is within all.’ ‘Which is within all [things], Yājñavalkya?’ ‘You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing; you cannot think the thinker of thought; you can not know the knower of knowledge. This is your Self that is within all; everything else but this is perishable’” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, 3.4.2). *yad eva sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaras taṃ me vyācakṣvety eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ katamo yājñavalkya sarvāntaraḥ. na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ paśyer na śruteḥ śrotāraṃ śṛṇuyā na mater mantāraṃ manvīthā na vijñāter vijñātāraṃ vijānīyāḥ. eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaro'to'nyad ārtam ...*<sup>9</sup>

Here the commentator speaks of non-agency of “seer” (*draṣṭṛ*), negating such an interpretation as “the seer of seeing [is] the doer of seeing” (*dṛṣṭer draṣṭā dṛṣṭeḥ kartā*). The wrong interpretation of this expression presupposes “the seeing” (*dṛṣṭi*) as something to be done or something done and “the seer” as a doer.<sup>10</sup> The first reason why this interpretation is

<sup>9</sup> ĪDUŚB., 160.

<sup>10</sup> The commentator Śaṅkara explains thus: “[According to the wrong interpretation,] ‘[you can] not [see] the seer of seeing’ means that you cannot see the seer of seeing, [namely,] the doer of mere seeing, without discriminating the seeing (*dṛṣṭi*). The genitive case [as in *dṛṣṭeḥ* (of seeing)] is used in the meaning of accusative. That *dṛṣṭi* (seeing) is [something] to be done and [something] done, like *jar*. The agency of *dṛṣṭi* (seeing) is spoken of by the suffix *ṭṛ* of the word *draṣṭṛ*.” *na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ dṛṣṭeḥ kartāraṃ dṛṣṭibhedam akṛtvā dṛṣṭimātrasya kartāraṃ na paśyer iti. dṛṣṭer iti karmaṇi śaṣṭhī. sā dṛṣṭiḥ kriyamāṇā ghaṭavat karma bhavati. draṣṭāraṃ iti tṛjantena draṣṭur dṛṣṭi kartṛtvam ācaṣṭe. Ibid., 808.*

to be negated is that, if this word “seer” is understood as agency, the expression *drṣṭer draṣṭā* would be redundant (*ādhikya*). “[It becomes] meaningless to hold the word *drṣṭi* with the genitive case-ending there ... The word *drṣṭeḥ* becomes meaningless, because [*draṣṭṛ*,] having *ṭṛ* as a suffix, [is already enough] to stand for ‘the agency of seeing.’” *tatra drṣṭer iti śaṣṭhyantena drṣṭigrahaṇaṃ nirarthakaṃ ... ṭṛjantenaiva drṣṭikarṭṛvasya siddhatvāt drṣṭer iti nirarthakaṃ*.<sup>11</sup> The second reason is that there is a word “revealer” (*prakāśayitr*). It has a suffix *ṭṛ*, but does not necessarily indicate “doer.”<sup>12</sup>

However, while, as the commentary says, the seer as in “the seer of seeing” is not to be understood as a perceiver or an epistemological subject --- in the same way, the seeing is not to be understood as something perceived or an epistemological object ---, this expression “the seer of seeing” still implies “essence” or “the own nature” (*svarūpa*), which is to be discriminated from empirical cognition. This issue is still to be questioned

## Vijñāna-maya

As for the word *vijñāna-maya* (literally “consisting of knowledge”), *vijñāna* here does not mean “intuitive knowledge.” It is clear, also because another expression *mano- maya* (literally “being consisting of the mind”) is used instead of it. However, this word is still a key for considering “intuitive knowledge” (*jñāna*).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> The commentator also explains thus: “As it is seen that the words having the suffix *ṭṛ* are used with regard to the doer of the temporal actions, such as *chetṭṛ* (cutter), *bhetṭṛ* (breaker) and *ganṭṛ* (goer), is this [word] *draṣṭṛ* also [to be considered] in the same way? No, [it is not necessarily so, for example,] *prakāśayitr* (revealer).” *nanu anityakriyākartṛviśaya eva ṭṛcpratyayāntasya śabdasya prayogo drṣṭo yathā chettā bhetṭā ganteti, tathā draṣṭety atrāpīti cen na, prakāśayiteti drṣṭatvāt*. *Ibid.*, 897.

<sup>13</sup> There are the concepts *anna-maya* (consisting of food) and *ānanda-maya* (consisting of bliss), which are spoken of along with *vijñāna-maya* in the later Vedānta system. However, Śaṅkara considers *anna-maya* and *ānanda-maya* as modification (*vikāra*). In this point, Śaṅkara’s view is obviously different from the trend of the later Vedānta system. See ĪDUŚB., 294.



What is to be considered in the word *vijñāna-maya* is rather the meaning of *-maya*. The argument here begins with a verse of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* : “Ajātaśatru said, ‘When this puruṣa [namely, Brahma], consisting of the [empirical] knowledge, was thus asleep, where was it at that time, and whence did it thus come?’ Gārgya did not know that” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, 2.1.16). *sa hovācājātaśatrur yatraiṣa etat supto’bhūd ya eṣa vijñānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ kvaṣa tadābhūt kuta etad āgād iti tad u ha na mene gārgyaḥ*..<sup>14</sup>

According to the commentator Śaṅkara, the word *-maya* in *vijñāna-maya* should not be understood in the sense of “made of” or “consisting of.” Neither should it be understood in the sense of “resembling.” It is verily because the Self (*ātman*) --- which is here called *vijñāna-maya* --- is never known to be an effect or a modification, while these interpretations, such as “made of,” “consisting of,” or “resembling,” imply an effect or a modification. The commentator says: “[The word] *-maya* [in] *vijñāna-maya* [is used in the sense of] ‘being full of’” (*tanmayas tatprāyo vijñānamaya*). Again, what is meant by “being full of” (*prāya*)? “[It means] being perceived in it [empirical] knowledge (*vijñāna*)], being perceived along with it, and being perceiver [along with it]” (*tasminn upalabhyatvaṃ tena copalabhyatvam upalabdhrtaṃ ca*). Furthermore, in regard to the meaning “being full of knowledge,” there is a more important thing; it implies “something already well known” or “something already familiar.” The commentator says: “It is also because [Brahma] is repeatedly spoken of as something already well known, as it is said, ‘that which is full of [empirical] knowledge’ ...” (*‘ya eṣa vijñānamayaḥ’ iti ca prasiddhavad anuvādāt* ...).<sup>15</sup> The similar idea in regard to the concept *vijñāna-maya* is also expounded in the *Chāndogya*: “[Brahma is] that which consists of mind, the body of which is *prāṇa*, the form of which is splendour” (*manomayaḥ prāṇaśarīro bhārūpaḥ*) (*Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, 3.14.2).<sup>16</sup> The commentator here explains thus: “[Brahma] is that which consists of the mind, that which is full of the mind. [Here]

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 726.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 428.

the mind means that along with which one thinks. Through its own function, it is engaged in objects. [Brahma] is full of this [mind], [namely Brahma is-realised] along with this [mind]. Thus, [Brahma] is engaged in [the objects] along with it [the mind], as it were, and is detached from [the object], as it were.” *manomayo manaḥprāyaḥ. manute’neneti manas tatsvavṛtṭyā viṣayeṣu pravṛttaṃ bhavati tena manasā tanmayāḥ. tathā pravṛtta iva tatprāyo nivṛtta iva ca.*<sup>17</sup>

Although the question why the intuitive knowledge is called “essence” or “the own nature” (*svarūpa*) --- or why the intuitive knowledge is called “the seer of seeing” in spite of the ambiguity of the expression --- is not answered yet, at least it is sure that this intuitive knowledge, also called the pure knowledge or the knowledge of Brahma, is to be discriminated from the empirical knowledge, and that this intuitive knowledge is first obtained along with the empirical knowledge, and that this intuitive knowledge is something already known along with the empirical knowledge.

## Paññā

This study assumes that, in early Buddhism, the truth (Pāli *sacca*, Skt. *satya*) is almost equivalent to *dhamma* (Skt. *dharma*). In regard to the Dhamma, a Thai Buddhist, Buddhādāsa, emphasises the importance of “intuitive knowledge” as follows: “Rational thinking is neither intuitive knowledge nor what is called ‘seeing the Dhamma.’ One can not see the Dhamma through rational thinking. But one can know it intuitively through a true inner realisation.” การคำนึงคำนวณตามหลักเหตุผลนั้น ไม่ใช่ การเห็นแจ้งอย่างที่เราเรียกว่า “เห็นธรรม” ... การเห็นธรรมจึงไม่อาจจะเห็นได้ด้วยการคำนวณไปตามเหตุผล; แต่ต้องเห็นแจ้งด้วยความรู้สึกรภายในที่แท้จริง ...<sup>18</sup>

Traditionally, *paññā* (intuitive knowledge) is said to mean “knowing the four noble truths.” For example, in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*: “What does one know intuitively? One knows intuitively that this is dukkha, and one

<sup>17</sup> *ĪDUŚB.*, 429.

<sup>18</sup> พุทธทาสภิกขุ, *คู่มือมนุษย์ ฉบับสมบูรณ์* (กรุงเทพฯ: สุขภาพใจ, พ.ศ. 2549), 49-50.

knows intuitively that this is the arising of dukkha, and one knows intuitively that this is the cessation of dukkha, and one knows intuitively that this is the way of cessation of dukkha.” *kiñca pajānāti idaṃ dukkhanti pajānāti ayaṃ dukkhasamudayoti pajānāti ayaṃ dukkhanirodhoti pajānāti ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadāti pajānāti ...*<sup>19</sup>

As for this *paññā*, what is to be understood carefully is that this intuitive knowledge is first only possible along with empirical knowledge (or rational knowledge), and that this is not related to a certain blind subjectivism. There is no possibility of this kind of “intuitive knowledge,” if there is no “empirical knowledge.” The *Poṭṭhapāda-sutta* runs thus: “It is, Oh Poṭṭhapāda, empirical knowledge (*saññā*), that arises first, and after that intuitive knowledge (*ñāṇa*) [arises]. And intuitive knowledge arises because of the arising of the [empirical] knowledge. And thus one recognises: ‘It is truly from this condition (*idappaccaya*) that intuitive knowledge (*ñāṇa*) has arisen to me.’” *saññā kho poṭṭhapāda paṭhamam uppajjati pacchā ñāṇam saññuppadā ca pana ñāṇuppadō hoti so evam pajānāti idappaccayā kira me ñāṇam udapādīti.*<sup>20</sup>

By the way, let us avoid concluding easily that this text maintains a kind of empiricism, namely a doctrine which regards our empirical sense perception in this temporal and manifold world as the only source of our knowledge. What is meant by this text is not so simple. It is far from our natural or ordinal attitude. The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* speaks of these two kinds of knowledge thus: “That which is intuitive knowledge (*paññā*), Oh friend, and that which is empirical knowledge (*viññāṇa*), these states (*dhammā*) are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states, [even] through having separated repeatedly. What one knows intuitively (*pajānāti*), Oh friend, is what one knows empirically (*vijānāti*); and what one knows empirically is what one knows intuitively ...” *yā cāvuso paññā yañca viññāṇam ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇam paññāpetum yañca āvuso pajānāti taṃ vijānāti yaṃ vijānāti taṃ pajānāti ...*<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> M.Ṭ. 12/494/536-537.

<sup>20</sup> T.Ṭ. 9/288/230.

<sup>21</sup> M.Ṭ. 12/494/537.

However, there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. For example, the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* expresses this difference thus: “That which is intuitive knowledge, Oh friend, and that which is empirical knowledge, these states are associated, not dissociated. [But] intuitive knowledge (*paññā*) is to be developed (*bhāvetabba*), empirical knowledge (*viññāṇa*) is to be known fully (*pariññeyya*). This is the difference between them.” *yā cāvuso paññā yañca viññāṇaṃ imesaṃ dhammānaṃ saṃsaṭṭhānaṃ no visaṃsaṭṭhānaṃ paññā bhāvetabbā viññāṇaṃ pariññeyyaṃ idaṃ nesaṃ nānākaraṇanti.* <sup>22</sup>

In early Buddhism, “intuitive knowledge,” which is only the way to the truth, the Dhamma, is not the same as the empirical knowledge, whereas the former is not possible apart from the latter. This type of thought is extremely similar to what we have seen in our consideration about the old Upaniṣads, although the philosophical meaning of this intuitive knowledge is not clear enough yet.

## Brahma as transcendental knowledge

In the old Upaniṣads, one of the biggest themes is “Being.” However, this theme is to be considered not from the view point of theistic ontology, but from the view point of knowledge. In regard to the arguments about Being, the most important thing is mentioned in a verse (*Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, 6.1.3) thus: “[Oh Śvetaketu], have you asked about that instruction, through which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown [becomes] known, [and] the unrecognised [becomes] recognised?” [Śvetaketu asked,] “How, Oh Bhagavat, is the instruction [possible]?” *uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyaḥ yenāśrutam śrutam bhavaty amataṃ matam avijñātam vijñātam iti kataṃ nu bhagavaḥ sa ādeśo bhavatīti.* <sup>23</sup>

Paul Deussen, a scholar who first pointed out the philosophical significance of this verse, translates Uddālaka’s question in the citation above thus, “Have you then asked about that instruction, through which [also] the unheard becomes an [already] heard, the understood an understood, and the unrecognised a recognised?” *Hast du denn auch der*

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> *ĪDUŚB.*, 504.

*Unterweisung nachgefragt, durch welche [auch] das Ungehörte ein [schon] Gehörtes, das Unverstandene ein Verstandenes, das Unerkannte ein Erkanntes wird?* <sup>24</sup> It is evident that he intends to show what is questioned here as something non-temporal, by inserting the words “also” (*auch*) and “already” (*schon*). The commentator Śaṅkara explains this question --- which is “extraordinary” (*adbhuta*) --- thus: “How does something become known through the knowledge of the other thing --- this is not well known fact? ...” *katham nv etad aprasiddham anyavijñānenānyad vijñātaṁ bhavati ...* <sup>25</sup> Through this intuitive knowledge the unknown becomes known. Through it we come to know something. This knowledge is preceding our experience or our empirical knowledge.

Besides, “Being” is also spoken of as *kāraṇa* (cause, reason, or ground) or *mūla* (root or ground). This *kāraṇa* --- or *mūla* --- does not mean “temporal cause.” “Being” as the root (*sanmūlaṁ*) is the ground of the world (*jagato mūlaṁ*). “All beings have ‘Being’ as their root, as their support, or as their ground” (*sanmūlāḥ .... imāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ*), and “those have Being as their ground” (*satkāraṇāḥ*). What is meant by this Being as their ground --- or the ground of the world --- is not different from the meaning of the “all this [world] is Brahma” (*sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ brahma*) (*Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, 3.14.1). The commentator explains thus: “Thus, [this world] in the three states is not different from Brahma-Ātman, because it [this world] is not understood without that [Brahma]. Therefore, this world is that [Brahma] indeed. Furthermore, in the sixth [chapter of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*], we will explain in detail how this [world] is verily that [Brahma], one, without a second.” *evaṁ brahmātmatayā triṣu kālēṣu aviśiṣṭaṁ tadvyatirekeṇa agrahaṇāt. ataḥ tad eva idaṁ jagat. yathā cedam tad eva ekaṁ advītiyaṁ tathā ṣaṣṭhe vistareṇa vakṣyāmaḥ*. <sup>26</sup> Therefore, the intuitive knowledge is preceding our experience not temporally, but logically. This is a meaning of “intuitiveness” of this type of knowledge. In this point of view, Radhakrishana is correct in saying : “The logical priority of Brahman to the world is brought out by

<sup>24</sup> Paul Deussen, *Die Philosophie der Upanishad's*, 40-41.

<sup>25</sup> *ĪDUŚB.*, 504.

<sup>26</sup> *ĪDUŚB.*, 428.

the statement that Being alone was this in the beginning.”<sup>27</sup> In the sense of the logical priority, it is perhaps possible for us to call Brahma --- as the ground of the world --- as “the transcendental” or “the transcendental ground.” Therefore, what is to be questioned under the theme of Being is the intuitive knowledge. This knowledge is the logical ground of our actual recognition, namely, that through which our empirical knowledge is established.

It is an undeniable fact that what we can experience is the individual and temporal things --- but, it is not reasonable to conclude from this that everything we can experience is the empirical ---. While they still firmly keep a longing for the Immortal, the Upaniṣadic thinkers with a critical spirit, such as Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka Āruṇi, and so on, begin with accepting this fact. This is the very starting point of the Upaniṣadic thought. As the intuitive knowledge --- the knowledge of Brahma --- is called “consisting of [empirical] knowledge” or “full of [empirical] knowledge” (*vijñānamaya*), it is perceived in empirical knowledge, or it is perceived along with it.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, this knowledge is not necessarily that which is to be obtained. It is something already known along with our empirical recognition. In short, the intuitive knowledge is the transcendental ground of empirical knowledge, and the empirical knowledge is limiting adjuncts of the intuitive knowledge. The eternal --- here intuitive knowledge --- is first to be investigated verily in our empirical knowledge, or along with it. It must be investigated something already known in our empirical knowledge. It must be the logical ground, or the essence (*svārūpa*) through which the individual and temporal knowledge is established. Moreover, verily because this knowledge as the logical ground or the essence is prior to empirical knowledge, Brahma --- or the knowledge of Brahma --- can also be called *sarvajña* (the omniscient or the universal),<sup>29</sup> namely, this knowledge is that through which everything established through this knowledge is understood. As it is seen in the arguments of Being, this intuitive knowledge is the logical ground or the essence of our recognition of this world, but neither the

<sup>27</sup> Radhakrishnan, ed. trans. **The Principal Upaniṣads**, 448

<sup>28</sup> See **ĪDUŚB.**, 726.

<sup>29</sup> For example, see the Praśna-upaniṣad (4.11). Ibid., 128.

temporal cause as the originator of the world, nor the substratum of the objects. Moreover, although it is called *jñātr* (literally, knower), the Self is the epistemological transcendental ground, but not the subject of act of knowing.

Therefore, verily, this intuitive knowledge is the consistent theme spoken of through the following statements: “Have you asked about that instruction, through which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown [becomes] known, [and] the unrecognised [becomes] recognised?”; “How does something become known through the knowledge of the other thing --- this is not well known fact ---?”; “[It is] that which is not expressed by speech, [but] that by which speech is expressed; you must know that alone to be Brahma, not that which one worships” (*yad vācā’nabhyuditaṃ yena vāg abhyudyate. tad eva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yad idam upāsate*).<sup>30</sup> “[Brahma is] verily speech of speech” (*vāco ha vācaṃ*).<sup>31</sup> “When speaking, [Brahma is called] speech” (*vadan vāk*).<sup>32</sup> “He who controls the speech from within” (*yo vācam antaro yamayati*).<sup>33</sup>

## The Dhamma as universal knowledge

In regard to our recognition of this external world, early Buddhism speaks of “the Dhammas” (*dhammā*), such as the five aggregates (*khandha*), eighteen elements (*dhātu*), twelve bases (*āyatana*), and so on.

What is to be noted here is that these concepts are always presented to negate any substratum in the temporal and manifold things. The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* speaks of rūpa thus: “Therefore, Oh bhikkhus, here in regard to whatever is rūpa --- in the past, in the future, [or] at present, internal or external, gross or subtle, low or excellent, distant or near ---, all rūpas should be seen thus by right [intuitive] knowledge as it is thus: This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.” *tasmātiha bhikkhave yankiñci*

<sup>30</sup> See the *Kena-upaniṣad* (1.5). *ĪDUŚB.*, 21.

<sup>31</sup> See the *Kena-upaniṣad* (1.2). *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>32</sup> See the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (1.4.7). *Ibid.*, 654.

<sup>33</sup> See the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (3.7.17). *Ibid.*, 823.

*rūpaṃ atītānāgata- paccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā pañītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā sabbaṃ rūpaṃ netam mama nesohamasmi na meso attāti evametam yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbam.*<sup>34</sup> The *Chachakka-sutta* also speaks of rūpa thus: “If someone would say, ‘Eye is the Self,’ it is not possible. For both the origination and the decaying of the eye are known [intuitively]. ... If someone would say, ‘Rūpas are the Self,’ it is not possible. For both the origination and the decaying of the rūpas are known [intuitively].” *cakkhu attāti yo evaṃ vadeyya taṃ na upapajjati. cakkhusa uppādopi vayopi paññāyati. ... rūpā attāti yo vadeyya taṃ na upapajjati. rūpānaṃ uppādopi vayopi paññāyati.*<sup>35</sup>

It is quite appropriate to understand that what these texts mean is to refuse our vain search for “entity” or “substratum” --- the eternal as a support of the individual things --- in this temporal and manifold world. Moreover, it is also appropriate to understand that the word *dhātu* (element) --- or *dhamma* --- implies “lifeless” (*nijjīva*) or “soulless” (*nissatta*). What is just supposed or postulated as the eternal should not be transferred in this temporal and manifold world. This is a rigid principle of early Buddhism.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> ม.ญ. 12/284/276.

<sup>35</sup> ม.อุ. 14/818/512.

<sup>36</sup> “Moreover, *dhātu* is verily a term for the lifeless (*nijjīva*) of the self (*atta*). Thus, as it is said, ‘Oh Bhikkhu, this man has six *dhātus*,’ the Bhagavā taught about *dhātu* that the life (*jīva*), the aggregate of [empirical] knowledge, is not the self. Therefore, this is the exposition to be known in such a meaning as is already said, [namely], in the following meaning: It is an eye and that is *dhātu*. It is the eye-*dhātu*. ... It is mind-consciousness and that is *dhātu*. It is mind-consciousness-*dhātu*.” *Api ca, dhātū ti nijjīvamattass’ev’etaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Tathā hi Bhagavā “Chadhāturo ayaṃ bhikkhu puriso” ti ādisu jīvasaññāsamūhananattam dhātudesanaṃ akāsī ti. Tasmā yathāvuttena atthena, cakkhu ca taṃ dhātu ca cakkhudhātu ... pe ... manoviññāṇaṃ ca taṃ dhātu ca manoviññāṇadhātū ti evaṃ tāv’ettha atthato veditabbo vinicchayo.* Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 412. “Once more the Cy. [commentary] points out ... the significance of the affix -*dhātu* (element), as meaning the absence of entity (*nissatta*), the ‘emptiness’ or phenomenal character of the ideational faculty.” Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids, ed. **A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics** (London and Boston: P.T.S., 1974), 119-121 n. 3.



“The fundamental importance in Buddhist philosophy of this Phenomenalism or Non-substantialism as a protest against the prevailing Animism, which, beginning with projecting the self into objects, saw in that projected self a noumenal quasi-divine substance, has by this time been more or less admitted.”<sup>37</sup> However, it does not follow from this principle that the concept dhamma --- or dhātu --- in Early Buddhism is to be interpreted from the viewpoint of empiricism, sensationalism, or phenomenism. Needless to say, negating the transfer of the supposed or postulated substratum into this ephemeral world does not necessarily mean the view of the world of “materialist” or “sensationalist” --- including a scientific view of the world ---. On the contrary, early Buddhism is consistently against such views, which belong to our natural and ordinary attitude. What should be considered here is intuitive knowledge, through which the Dhamma --- or the Dhammas (*dhammā*) --- is to be understood, or through which this entire ephemeral world is to be understood.

By the way, as for the word dhamma (Skt. *dharma*), it is derived from a verbal root *dhṛ* --- which means “hold,” “bear,” or “keep” ---. Buddhaghosa explains this word thus: “*dhammā* means causing to bear the own character” (*attano lakkaṇaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*) in the commentary on the *Majjhima-nikāya*.<sup>38</sup> In the *Visuddhimagga*, he also explains thus: “The Dhammas mean the essences” (*Dhammā ti sabhāvā*), “Here again paññā has the characteristic of penetrating the essence of the Dhamma” (*ettha pana, dhammasabhāva-paṭivedhalakkaṇā paññā*).<sup>40</sup>

As for the word dhātu (element), it sometimes means “distributing” like this: “Thus each Dhamma among such as ‘eye’ and so on, as it comes into existence, is called a *dhātu* in regard to such a meaning as, ‘it distributes, it is laid out’” *Iti cakkhādīsu ekeko dhammo yathāsambhavaṃ, vidadhati dhīyati ti ādinā atthavasena dhātū ti vuccati*.<sup>41</sup> But, it also means

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, xlii.

<sup>38</sup> **J.Ö.** 1/18. The similar explanation is found in the *Visuddhimagga*: “The Dhammas mean that [they] cause to hold [their] own characteristic.” *Attano lakkaṇaṃ dhārayanti ti dhammā*. Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 408.

<sup>39</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 242.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 370.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 411.

“the essence”: “But these are the dhātus, as it is said that they cause to hold the own essence.” *Etā pana, attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentī ti dhātuyo*.<sup>42</sup> Here is a question. How should we understand the Dhammas or the dhātus which are said to be the essences?

Mrs. Rhys Davids, who radically interprets early Buddhism as non-substantialism or phenomenism, explains the Dhamma as the essence thus, “... He [Buddhaghosa] gives a more positive expression to this particular meaning by saying that dhammo, so employed, signifies ‘that which has the mark of bearing its own nature’ (or character or condition --- sabhāva-dhāraṇa); i.e. that which is not dependent on any more ultimate nature. This, to us, somewhat obscure characterization may very likely, in view of the context, mean that dhammo as phenomenon is without substratum, is not a quality cohering in a substance.”<sup>43</sup> Needless to say, Mrs. Rhys Davids is right. Early Buddhism is against the prevailing animism, and rejects the projection on the Self into the ephemeral and individual objects. It must be appropriate to the word *dhātu* as “the absence of entity” (*nissatta*). Buddhaghosa explains the Dhammas and the Dhātus thus, “Again, they are dhātus, because they hold their own characteristic, and because they hold dukkha, and because they lay down dukkha, and because none of them are beyond the characteristic of the dhātu. They are the Dhammas, because they hold the conformity to the momentariness; [they] are non-eternal in the sense of destruction, and are dukkha in the sense of fear, and are non-self in the sense of having no essence (*rasa*).” *salakkhaṇadhāraṇato pana dukkhādānato ca dukkhādhānato ca sabbā pi dhātulakkhaṇaṃ anatītattā dhātuyo; salakkhaṇadhāraṇena ca attano khaṇānurūpadhāraṇena ca dhammā; khayaṭṭhena aniccā, bhayaṭṭhena dukkhā, asārakaṭṭhena anattā*.<sup>44</sup> It is sure that it is the most rigid principle in early Buddhism not to transfer the eternal --- which is substratum --- in this temporal and manifold world.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> C. Davids, ed. **A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics**, xl.

<sup>44</sup> Warren, ed. **Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya**, 308.

However, Mrs. Rhys Davids seems to be still irresolute in interpreting the concept *dhamma*. Why must she say “this somewhat obscure characterization”? This study assumes that it is still not reasonable enough to understand the Dhamma as “bearing the essence” only from the viewpoint of non-substantialism. In that case, how should we understand the Dhamma as “holding the essence”? This is the next question.

Let us return to the topic “*dukkha*” as something universal. It is notable that *dukkha* is often considered as something closely related to “impermanence” (*aniccatā*), as it is seen in the text of the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*: “[Oh bhikkhus,] again, is it proper to regard that which is non-eternal, is *dukkha*, and has the Dhamma of change (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*), as ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self?’” *yampanāniccam dukkham vipariṇāmadhammam kalam nu tam samanupassitum etam mama esohamasmi eso me attāti*.<sup>45</sup> As this text assumes that a ground of *dukkha* is “non-eternality” (*aniccatā*), *dukkha* is first “the state of *dukkha* of change” (*vipariṇāma-dukkhatā*). This state of *dukkha* of change, as something non-particular, is here called the Dhamma of change (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*).<sup>46</sup>

In the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga-sutta*, *rūpa* (visible object) --- together with *sadda* (object of hearing), *gandha* (object of smelling), *rasa* (object of tasting), *phoṭṭhabba* (tangible object), and *dhamma* (object of consciousness) --- mentioned thus: “However, one has known the impermanence of *rūpas*, [their] change, the dispassion [from them], and [their] destruction,

<sup>45</sup> J. J. 12/284/275-276.

<sup>46</sup> The word *vipariṇāma-dhamma* is not to be interpreted as “changing Dhamma,” but “**the Dhamma of change**” or “**the Dhamma on changing things**” --- in plural, “those which have the Dhamma of change” ---. As for the word *dhamma* or *dhammā*, in some cases it is used in the meaning of “thing” or “things” as object of consciousness (*viññāṇa*, *mano-viññāṇa*), but, needless to say, it is to be discriminated from the Dhamma as the truth, which is under discussion. Therefore, the expressions *vipariṇāma-dhamma*, *khaya-dhamma*, *vaya-dhamma*, *virodha-dhamma*, or *saṅkhata-dhamma* mean rather “the Dhamma on changing things,” “the Dhamma on decaying things,” “the Dhamma on aging things,” “the Dhamma on ceasing things,” and “the Dhamma on formed things” than “changing Dhamma,” “decaying Dhamma,” “aging Dhamma,” “ceasing Dhamma,” and “formed Dhamma” respectively.

seeing as it really is through the right intuitive knowledge, ‘Formerly and now all these rūpas are impermanent, dukkha, those which have the Dhamma of change.’” *rūpānaṃ tveva aniccatam veditvā vipariṇāmavirāgaṇirodhaṃ pubbe ceva rūpā etarahi ca sabbe te rūpā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammāti evameva yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato ...*<sup>47</sup> What is here to be noted is that the Dhamma of change is realised for “all” rūpas and so on. Generally speaking, the probability of our knowledge is increased through our empirical knowledge. But the necessity of our knowledge never comes from our empirical knowledge. Similarly, the universal proposition --- such as proposition including “all” or “everything” (*sabba*, Skt. *sarva*) --- never comes from our empirical knowledge. Although early Buddhism never changes the idea that such universal statements is to be realised along with empirical knowledge in this ephemeral world --- otherwise the statement is empty in content ---, it is evident that this statement as universal proposition requires something beyond empirical knowledge. What is required for it is the intuitive knowledge, as it is said in the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*: “Therefore, Oh bhikkhus, here in regard to whatever is rūpa --- in the past, in the future, [or] at present, internal or external, gross or subtle, low or excellent, distant or near ---, all rūpas should be seen thus by right [intuitive] knowledge as it is.” It is the intuitive knowledge, the intuitive knowledge of the Dhamma, which is also called “the omniscience” or “the universal knowledge” (*sabbaññitā-ñāṇa*).<sup>48</sup>

## Conclusion

Admittedly, the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism have their own philosophical backgrounds. As for the pursuit of the truth, the old Upaniṣads begin with inquiring the eternal --- Being ---. On the other hand, early Buddhism, throughout its pursuit of the truth, has a rigid principle to consistently negate our vain search for the eternal in this ephemeral world. It might be not necessarily wrong that the former might be classified as theistic

<sup>47</sup> ม.อ. 14/626/402.

<sup>48</sup> See ที.อ. 1/93.

ontology and the latter might be regarded as materialistic or sensationalistic ethics. However, from the view point of “knowledge” --- especially “intuitive knowledge” ---, this paper concludes that there is a strong philosophical trend common to these two.

In the old Upaniṣads, “intuitive knowledge” is not possible apart from our empirical perception. Moreover, this intuitive knowledge is a kind of transcendental or universal knowledge. Whereas “Being” is considered as a ground (*kāraṇa*), it does not mean a temporal cause, but a logical reason or ground. Shortly, “Being” is the transcendental concept, that through which this entire ephemeral world is to be understood. “Being” is prior to this world. But it is prior in a logical sense. On the other hand, evidently, early Buddhism does not agree that the eternal is to be supposed in this ephemeral world. It emphasises the transitoriness of this temporal world. But, it is still not appropriate to consider early Buddhism as a kind of empiricism, such as non-substantialism, phenomenism, or sensational ethics. As seen in this paper, the Dhamma is also regarded as that which bears --- or causes to bear --- “the own nature” or “essence” (*sabhāva*, Skt. *svabhāva*). Since it is extremely clear that this “essence” can not be understood in the sense of “substratum” in the ephemeral sphere, this “essence” must be the logical reason or ground, that through which this entire ephemeral world is to be understood. Verily through this intuitive knowledge --- the universal knowledge or the omniscience --- as “the state of dukkha of change” (*vipariṇāma-dukkhatā*) or “the Dhamma of change” (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*) ---, this entire ephemeral world is known. Thus, “intuitive knowledge” (*paññā*) in early Buddhism is also a kind of universal or transcendental knowledge --- which is first found in the old Upaniṣads ---. It is true that the old Upaniṣads and early Buddhism have their own philosophical backgrounds, and that they have their own points of argument. However, at least, in regard to this intuitive knowledge, which should be considered as the very starting point of the pursuit of the truth in both of them, early Buddhism is an authentic follower of the old Upaniṣads.

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